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Abstract: Merit based promotion & tenure decision have always been controversial. This paper 
suggests an agent based model of the decision making processs using spectral graph theory, 
where the voting agents are the vertices of the graph, and edge weights are determined based on 
the extent of collaborative research between the agents, as well as their estimated levels of social 
interactions. The model assumes that agents with lower research productivities tend to interact 
more often with one another. Using the graph theoretic spectrum, the paper proposes a 2-
dimenional influence diagram that maps the voting agents into points on a 2-dimensional grid, 
where agents that are likely to influence each other more are closely spaced. Next, a dynamic 
model is addressed, where votes are determined based on very small randomly assigned initial 
values, and the mutual interaction during the decision making process. The model is able to 
accurately reproduce a known promotion decision making from a department of a research 
oriented university which involved a sizeable number of voting agents with low research outputs. 
1. Introduction 
Academic promotion and tenure (P&T) criteria can be broadly divided into two categories, 
merit based and seniority based (Phelan, 2004). American universities have invariably 
adopted merit based P&T criteria. A well devised meit based P&T policy can have a very 
positive impact on the department, leading to higher academic productivity (Faria & Monteiro, 
2008).  
Unfortunately, and in spite of P&T guidelines that individual departments and institutions 
formulate, such decisions are beset with controversy. According to one survey, 37% of tenure 
track faculty feel that their department’s tenure criteria were unclear to them (American 
Council on Education, 2000). Studies report that personal connections between a candidate 
and individual members of the decision making body, significantly impacts the candidate’s 
success rate (Gersick, Dutton & Bartunek, 2000; Zinovyeva & Bagues, 2015). Elsewhere, a 
theoretical study analyzes the various factors influencing uncommitted committee members 
and suggests that such voters significantly affect the final decision (Ayres, Rowat & Zakariya, 
2007). In spite of its significance, there is a dearth of literature on theoretical models of the 
P&T decision process. To the best of author’s knowledge, there is only one such study that 
models the P&T decision making process (Ayres, Rowat & Zakariya, 2007). This investigation, 
which is based on game theory, is largely confined to only two member committees. 
 A novel approach to model a departmental P&T committee using spectral graph theory 
(Spielman, 2007) is proposed in this research. The P&T committee and the candidate (referred 
to as agents for the remainder of this paper) are represented as the vertices of a weighted, 
undirected graph. There are edges connecting every pair of vertices; their weights reflecting 
the levels of academic as well as social interaction between the corresponding agents. The 
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approach assumes that the degree to which agents influence each other is determined by their 
interactions, both research collaborations as well as other academic and social bonds.  
Using spectral embedding, this paper describes how the graph’s vertices can be mapped 
into points in a two-dimensional plane where distances between vertices depends inversely 
on the degrees of influence that the associated agents have upon one another. These two-
dimensional representations are referred to in this paper as influence diagrams. The decision 
making process on the P&T committee is modeled next. It is assumed that the agents in the 
committee contain both decided and undecided voters. The votes cast by the latter are based 
not only on the candidate’s merit but also how the agents influence each other during the 
decision making process. The committee agents own academic productivity is taken into 
account, with less productive faculty assuming more capricious positions. 
Academic inbreeding, i.e. the presence of faculty with degrees from the same department, 
is known to have a deleterious effect on the department (Horta, Veloso & Grediaga, 2010; 
Inanc & Tuncer, 2011). As academically inbred faculty generally show lower research 
productivity levels, it has been suggested that the practice be curtailed (Horta, 2013). 
Academic inbreeding in briefly addressed in this research.  
The results described here are based on the voting outcome of an actual department, which 
is kept confidential. From the actual experience of the candidate, the votes cast by the agents 
in that P&T committee have been estimated to a reasonably high degree of confidence. Official 
correspondence from competent authorities outside the department establish that the 
candidate merited a positive outcome, based on his/her research accomplishments. In the 
model described here, a high degree of emphasis is based on the candidates’ research 
publications (Faria et al., 2013); consequently, productivity levels of not only the candidate 
agent, but also those of the P&T committee is based on the numbers of their scholarly 
publications. The funding levels of individual agents is also taken into account. The edge 
weights are determined in a similar manner, based on account research paper co-authorship 
and joint funding. The productivy metric is consistent with faculty seniority, with ‘academic 
deadwood’ being the least productive (Chen & Zoega, 2010; Nikolioudakis et al., 2015) in that 
particular department. 
It has been shown that reasonable values of the parameters can recreate the outcome of 
the P&T decision with remarkable precision, thereby validating the model. The robustness of 
the parameters are also established here. Consistent with recent findings that inbred faculty 
tend to favor each other (Godechot & Louvet, 2008), small increments in the weights linking 
inbred agents allowed the model to reproduce the outcome to full accuracy. As one study 
reports the role of department leadership in productivity, although not specifically outcomes 
of such decision making (Bland et al., 2005; Parker et al., 2003), the role of that department’s 
head in ensuring a fairer voting outcome has been briefly considered. 
 
2. Approach 
Graph Parameters 
Academic scholarship can be determined based on a variety of factors, with research 
publications being the most common criterion. Other criteria include the total extramural 
support, the number of graduate students supervised, journal editorship, etc. Let 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑖) 
denote the output level (e.g. publication count) of agent 𝑖  for criterion 𝑘 . The weighted 
productivity level of agent 𝑖 is given by, 
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𝑝𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑖)
∑ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑗)𝑗
𝑘
.                                                                                                                  (1) 
In the above expression, 𝛽𝑘  are parameters that determine the weights placed on each 
criterion 𝑘  in evaluating the overall productivity. The summation in the denominator is 
carried out over all agents in the department, and is used to normalize the measure, so that it 
never exceeds unity, and to ensure that the relative weight of criterion 𝑘  is entirely 
determined by the value assigned to the corresponding numerical value of 𝛽𝑘 . 
 With 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗) quantifying the level of collaboration between agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 in terms of 
criterion 𝑘 , the overall level of research and other academic collaboration, 𝑅𝑖𝑗 , is obtained 
using the following expression. 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 = {
∑𝛼𝑘
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑖, 𝑗)
∑ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑘(𝑗)𝑗
𝑘
, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗;
0,                                          𝑖 = 𝑗.
                                                                                   (2) 
Table 1. Notation. 
 
 For simplicity, the model assumes that is the amount of time that each agent 𝑖 devotes to 
scholarly work is directly proportional to the productivity, 𝑝𝑖 . The remaining time can be 
spent in meetings as well as non-academic collaborations. Assuming that the maximum time 
spent by an individual within the department is 𝑃max, the quantity was 𝑆𝑖𝑗  below determines 
the level of social interactions between agents 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
𝑆𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑃max − 𝜂√𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗;
0,                                  𝑖 = 𝑗.
                                                                                                  (3) 
The quantity 𝜂 < 1  is a model parameter called the socialization constant. The other 
parameter, 𝑃max  must be high enough relative to 𝜂, so that for every pair of agents 𝑖 and 𝑗, 
𝑊𝑖𝑗 > 0. Negative values for the weights 𝑊𝑖𝑗  are not usually allowed in graphs, and 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 0 
would result in a graph that is not fully connected. 
Let ℐ be the set of academically inbred agents. To capture the effect of inbred voters, the 
vector 𝐮 is defined as, 
𝑢𝑖 = {
0,
1
  
𝑖 ∈ ℐ;
𝑖 ∉ ℐ.
                                                                                                                                    (4) 
The weight matrix is given by of the underlying graph is given by, 
𝐖 = 𝐑 + 𝐒 + 𝛾𝐮𝐮T.                                                                                                                          (5) 
The quantity 𝛾 is another model parameter called the inbreeding constant. To neglect any 
extra amount of influence that agents in ℐ may exert upon one another, the value of 𝛾 may be 
optionally set to zero, although a small positive value is suggested.  The Laplacian 𝐋 of the 
graph is obtained as, 
Symbol Variable Type Description 
𝑥, 𝑋 Scalar Non-bold, italics, with optional subscripts 
𝐱 Vector Bold, lowercase, non-italics, with optional subscripts or superscripts 
𝐗 Matrix Bold, uppercase, non-italics 
𝒳 Set Scripts, with optional subscripts 
𝑋𝑟𝑐 Matrix element Entry in row 𝑟 and column 𝑐 of matrix 𝐗 
𝑥𝑟 , 𝑥
𝑟  Vector element Entry in row 𝑟 of vector 𝐱 
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𝐿𝑖𝑗 = {
−𝑊𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗;
∑𝑊𝑖𝑘
𝑘
, 𝑖 = 𝑗.                                                                                                               (6) 
With 𝑁 being the total number of agents, 𝐖 and 𝐋 are 𝑁 × 𝑁 symmetric matrices. 
Influence Diagram 
The Laplacian 𝐋 has 𝑁 eigenvectors, 𝐯𝑛  (𝑛 = 1,2, … , 𝑁). Each eigenvector has an associated 
eigenvalue 𝜆𝑛. The eigenvalues and eigenvectors are indexed so that 𝜆1 ≤ 𝜆2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝜆𝑁. The 
smallest eigenvalue 𝜆1 of any graph is always zero. The two-dimensional influence diagram is 
a plot of 𝜆2
−1𝐯2  (x-axis) vs. 𝜆3
−1𝐯3  (y-axis). The coordinates of agent 𝑖  in this plot are the 𝑖
th 
entries of the vectors 𝜆2
−1𝐯2 and 𝜆3
−1𝐯3. Since all the weights of the graph are strictly positive, 
none of the other eigenvalues are zero, in particular 𝜆2, 𝜆3 > 0. 
 The primary purpose of the influence diagram is for visualization. Agents that collaborate 
more often appear closer together in the diagram. Visualization can be further enhanced by 
quantifying the amount of influence any agent 𝑖 with coordinates 𝐳𝑖  exerts at any other point 
𝐳 in the plot. For example, if 𝑥𝑖  is the voting decision of each agent 𝑖, the net influence 𝑥(𝐳) at 
𝐳 of all agents can be formulated using the following expression. 
𝑥(𝐳) = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑒
1
𝜎
‖𝐳−𝐳𝒊‖
2
𝑖
.                                                                                                                     (7) 
In the above expression, ‖𝐳 − 𝐳𝒊‖  is the Euclidean distance between the two dimensional 
points 𝐳  and 𝐳𝑖 , and the quantity 𝜎  is a small parameter that can be adjusted for best 
visualization. 
Dynamic Voting Analysis 
In a typical P&T decision process, some of the agents in the committee enter the process 
having determined a priori there voting decision. Their participation is restricted to influence 
the votes of the undecided agents (Ayres, Rowat & Zakariya, 2007). Accordingly, the model 
distinguishes between three sets of agents, 𝒱−  and 𝒱+ are the sets of agents with prior 
decisions to vote against, and in favor of the candidate. The set of undecided agents, 𝒱U 
comprises of all remaining agents. Note that the candidate agent 𝑐 is not included in any of 
these sets, 𝒱−, 𝒱+ or 𝒱U. 
 The votes cast by each undecided agent is based on a decision variable 𝑥𝑖 . When 𝑥𝑖  is 
positive, the agent 𝑖 votes in favor of the candidate, and when it is negative, the agent votes 
against the latter. For agents in 𝒱− and 𝒱+ the decision variable is only used to influence the 
undecided agents. Prior to the decision process, each agent’s decision variable in 𝒱U  is 
assigned a small random value 𝑥𝑖
0. For the agents in 𝒱− and 𝒱+, the values of 𝑥𝑖
0 are set to –1 
and +1. For the undecided agents, the initial value is obtained in the following manner. 
𝑥𝑖
0 = 𝛼 (
𝑝𝑖
𝑃max
𝑚𝑐 + (1 −
𝑝𝑖
𝑃max
) 𝑟) , 𝑖 ∈ 𝒱U.                                                                         (8) 
In the above expression, the quantity 𝑟 is a uniformly distributed random variable lying in the 
range –1 to +1 (i.e. 𝑟~𝑈[−1,+1]) and 𝛼  is a small positive constant that determines the 
maximum randomness. The quantity 𝑚𝑐 ∈ [−1,+1]  quantifies the overall merit of the 
candidate. The factor appearing within parenthesis to the right of the above equation contains 
two terms. The first term is directly proportional to 𝑝𝑖  so an undecided agent with a higher 
productivity places greater emphasis on the candidate’s own merit worthiness. The second 
term allows the votes cast by agents with lower productivities acquire more random initial 
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values. It should be noted that the only role of the noise parameter 𝛼 is to determine the range 
of initial voting assignments 𝑥𝑖
0 of the undecided agents in 𝒱U. 
For a deserving candidate the quantity 𝑚𝑐  can be set to a value of at most +1; conversely 
for an undeserving candidate 𝑚𝑐  can be assigned a value of no less than –1. Unless the merit 
of the candidate can be determined with a very high degree of confidence through extraneous 
means, a suggested way to assign a value to 𝑚𝑐  is according to either of the following two 
expressions provided below. 
𝑚𝑐 =
1
𝑃max
(𝑝𝑐 −
1
2
𝑃max),                                                                                                               (9) 
or, 
𝑚𝑐 =
1
𝑃max
(𝑝𝑐 −
1
2𝑁
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖
).                                                                                                      (10) 
The final value of the decision variables is determined in accordance with the expression 
shown below. 
𝐱 = ((1 + 𝜀)𝐈 + 𝜇𝐋)−1𝐱0.                                                                                                              (11) 
The quantities 𝜇  and 𝜀  above are the influence and regularization constants. The influence 
constant sets the degree to which agents’ decisions are decided through mutual interactions, 
relative to their random initial assignments. It can be shown that the above expression for 𝐱 
minimizes the following cost function. 
𝜑(𝐱) =
1
2
(‖𝐱 − 𝐱0‖
2 + 𝜀(𝐱 − 𝟏)T(𝐱 + 𝟏) + 𝜇𝐱T𝐋𝐱).                                                          (12)  
The first term within parenthesis appearing to the right of the above expression for the cost 
function acquires a minimum value of when none of the agents in the committee deviate from 
their initially assumed values, i.e. when 𝐱 = 𝐱0. This it minimizes the deviations of the agents’ 
decisions from their initial values. The second term is zero when each 𝑥𝑖  is either +1 or −1. It 
is optional, and can be included if the voting outcomes be close to ±1.  Simulations indicate 
that the relative outcome is not affected even with the constant 𝜀  being unity, although a 
sufficiently small value is recommended. 
The third term in the expression for 𝜑(𝐱) involves the Laplacian 𝐋. It can be shown that it 
simplifies as follows. 
𝐱T𝐋𝐱 =
1
2
∑∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2
𝑗≠𝑖𝑖
.                                                                                                  (13) 
The above expression shows that 𝐱T𝐋𝐱 is the sum of the squared difference between the 
decisions of every pair of agents 𝑖   and 𝑗 , weighted by 𝑊𝑖𝑗  which depicts the amount of 
influence they have on each other. Thus, each term tries to keep the voting outcomes of agents 
that exert more influence on each other, to remain closer. The quantity 𝜇 is termed the mutual 
influence constant.  
 
3. Case Study 
Committee Makeup 
As the scenario considered here pertained to the promotion decision of a candidate, multiple 
years were involved. Hence, the voting decisions of the committee members could be 
estimated to a very high degree of confidence. There were 11 agents, labeled 1 – 11, including 
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the candidate (𝑐 =1). The department head (ℎ = 4) was absent from the P&T committee, 
which consisted of the remaining 9 agents, so that 𝒱 = {2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11}. The agents in the 
P&T committee who made their decisions prior to the committee consisted of two supporting 
agents, who have a strong history of collaborative research with the candidate (7,8), and two 
malevolent agents (6,11) who cast negative votes. The set of academically inbred agents, who 
had received at least one degree from the same department, was ℐ = {2,3,4,11}. 
The justification that was provided  by agents 6 and 11 for their negative votes is 
considered in this research as not suitable grounds for that department’s P&T decisions 
because of three reasons: (i) the posited rationale they provided were not listed in the 
department’s P&T guidelines, (ii) the candidate’s research was subsequently found to meet or 
exceed the promotion criteria by more competent, higher level authority outside the 
department, and significantly, (iii) the previous year, another candidate ( 10 ) had been 
promoted without meeting the same requirements, and with both 6 and 11 voting in favor. 
For these reasons, the candidate has been considered as meriting a positive outcome 
wherever needed in the results described later. Additionally, it should be noted that the 
productivities, 𝑝6 = 0.789 and 𝑝11 = 0.727 of agents 6 and 11 were found to be relatively low 
in comparison to others, and based on their productivities as well as retirement status, agents 
6 and 11 may be considered academic deadwood (Chen & Zoega, 2010). Conversely, that of 
agents 7 and 8 were among the most productive in the department (𝑝7 = 4.087 and  𝑝8 =
2.769) (see below).  
Furthermore, agent 10 who had been successfully promoted the previous year, also voted 
against the candidate, agent 1’s P&T decision, despite being clearly aware that the rationale 
being set forth by agents 6 and 11, during the P&T meeting were not appropriate reasons. This 
agent (10) is classified as a strategic agent – the equivalent of a zero-sum player within a game 
theoretic context. Agent 10 also subsequently received academic recognition for which the 
candidate, agent 1, would have also qualified. It is recommended that without strong 
underlying reasons, such an agent should be included within the set of undecided agents.  
The final voting sets obtained is this manner were the set of malevolent and strategic 
agents, 𝒱− = {6,10,11}, the set of supportive agents, 𝒱+ = {7,8}, and the set of undecided 
agents 𝒱U = {2,3,5,9},  which includes the graduate program coordinator ( 𝑔 = 9). The 
simulations detailed below focus on how these four prior undecided agents arrived at their 
eventual decisions. Although to the best of the author’s knowledge, the voting decisions of all 
agents as well as their underlying justifications, as described earlier, are authentic, the 
simulations below are generalized enough to be able to recreate any other similar P&T 
decision process with a high degree of fidelity. The parameters used in the model were few, 
and they were assigned reasonable numerical values (sometimes zero). The model was found 
to be very robust to changes in these values.   
Graph Parameters 
The productivity vector 𝐩 and the collaboration matrix 𝐑 were constructed using only data 
that was readily available online at the institution’s website, which consisted of the number of 
journal publications, the total number of publications (including journal, conferences, and 
technical reports), and the funding obtained. A period of 4 years prior to the candidate’s P& T 
application was considered. If 𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑖), 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑖), and 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑖) represent the total number of 
journal articles published, total number of publications, and the total grant level by agent 𝑖 
during that period, its productivity level was computed in the manner suggested in Eq. (1), as 
follows. 
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𝑝𝑖 = 0.67 ×
𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑖)
∑ 𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑘)𝑘
+ 0.33 ×
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑖)
∑ 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑘)𝑘
+
𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑖)
∑ 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑘)𝑘
.                                (14) 
Note that for jointly funded projects, the quantity 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑖) was divided by the total number 
of PIs and co-PIs involved. In accordance with other findings (Faria et al. 2013), the journal 
publication count is assigned a higher weightage in comparison to other research 
publications. The numerical value of the productivity vector obtained was, 
𝐩 = [4.127 0.229  0.930  1.788  3.779  0.789  4.087  2.769  0.138  2.637  0.727].  
In order to account for administrative responsibilities of the department chair (ℎ = 4) and 
the graduate coordinator (𝑔 = 9), their productivities were incremented, so that the adjusted 
productivities were, 
𝑝𝑖 = {
𝑝𝑖 + 2,
𝑝𝑖 + 1,
𝑝𝑖 ,        
  
 𝑖 = ℎ;          
𝑖 = 𝑔;         
otherwise.
                                                                                                         (15) 
These adjusted values were used in all simulations described in this research. 
 With 𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗) and 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗) denoting the total number of published journal articles and 
all articles co-authored by any pair of agents 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗) being their joint funding, 
the academic and research collaboration between them was quantified in the following 
manner (see Eqn. (2)). 
𝑅𝑖𝑗 = {
0.67 ×
𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑖, 𝑗)
∑ 𝐽𝑂𝑈𝑅(𝑘)𝑘
+ 0.33 ×
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗)
∑ 𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿(𝑘)𝑘
+
𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑖, 𝑗)
∑ 𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷(𝑘)𝑘
, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗;
0,                                                                                                                      𝑖 = 𝑗.
                        (16) 
The collaboration matrix 𝐑 found using the above expression is shown below. 
𝐑 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.891
1.369
0.000
0.441
0.000
  
0.000
0.000
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.185
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
  
0.000
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
  
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.063
0.000
0.812
0.436
0.000
0.385
0.398
  
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.063
0.000
0.000
0.526
0.146
0.252
0.000
0.000
  
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.101
0.000
0.000
0.000
  
0.891
0.185
0.000
0.812
0.526
0.000
0.000
0.371
0.000
0.049
0.000
  
1.363
0.000
0.000
0.436
0.146
0.101
0.371
0.000
0.117
0.016
0.000
  
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.252
0.000
0.000
0.117
0.000
0.000
0.000
  
0.441
0.000
0.000
0.385
0.000
0.000
0.049
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
  
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.398
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Influence Diagram 
Figure 1 shows the two-dimensional influence diagram obtained from the 2nd and 3rd smallest 
eigenvectors of the Laplacian, for the following values, 𝜂 = 0.20,0.35,0.50 and 𝑃max = 6,9,12 
and 𝛾 = 0.0. Figure 2 is the influence diagram with the 𝜂 = 0.25, 𝑃max = 7, and 𝛾 = 0.25 that 
were used in all remaining simulations. The value 𝑃max = 7  can be interpreted as the 
productivity of a hypothetical agent who works seven days a week. The numerical values in 
figures 1 and 2 are slightly different merely to illustrate the robustness of the influence 
diagram. In both figures, the points are color coded for better visualization. The candidate 
(agent 1) is shown in yellow (bottom left). The agents in 𝒱+ as well as agent 9 (included in 𝒱U) 
who voted favorably appear in blue, whereas the agents that voted against are in red. The 
department chair who did not participate is shown in green. Agent 9, who voted in favor, and 
against the candidate in two separate instances, is shown in magenta. 
8 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Influence diagram with 𝜂 =  0.2 (top row), 0.35 
(middle row) and 0.5 (bottom row) and 𝑃max = 6 (left column), 
9 (center column) and 12 (right column). In all plots, 𝛾 = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same scale was used in all nine plots in figure 1. As 𝑃max is increased, the points move 
closer to each other. This is because higher 𝑃max results in higher values to the entries in the 
matrix 𝐒, representing social interactions. This can be interpreted as the agents having more 
time for socialization, thus increasing their levels of non-research related collaborative 
activity. The directions of movement of the points as 𝜂 is varied can be interpreted in a similar 
manner. It is also clearly observed that when 𝑃max and 𝜂 are varied, excluding agents 4 and 9, 
the relative positions of the other agents remain largely unchanged. This highlights the 
robustness of the influence diagram with respect to 𝑃max  and 𝜂. The points 4 and 9, which 
represent the department chair and graduate coordinator change relative to those of the other 
agents because their productivities 𝑝4 and 𝑝9 are incremented by constant amounts whereas 
those of the other agents are allowed to change in accordance with 𝑃max and 𝜂. 
The proximity of the points representing the undecided agents 2 and 3 to two malevolent 
agents 6 and 11 clearly shows how agents 2 and 3 voted negatively. Agent 9 is at a higher 
distance, and consequently did not vote negatively always. Agent 5 who is placed at a 
significantly larger distance, was clearly not influenced by the malevolent agents, explaining 
its eventual decision to cast a vote in favor. The effectiveness of the influence diagram in 
predicting the agents’ decisions is clearly demonstrated.  
Although the chair (agent 4) did not participate in the P&T decision making process, its 
potential role in influencing the choices of the other agents can be investigated through 
influence diagrams. This is addressed in the contoured plots in figure 3 where the agents in 
𝒱+  are assigned voting decisions 𝑥𝑖 = +1  while those in 𝒱
− , 𝑥𝑖 = −1 . For the undecided 
agents in 𝒱U, 𝑥𝑖 = 0. The contours are based on Eq. (7) with 𝜎 = 4 × 10
−4. The decision 𝑥4 of 
agent 4, representing the chair is kept at 𝑥4 = 0 in the left plot as the chair did not participate 
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Figure 2. Influence diagram with 𝜂 = 0.25, 𝑃max = 7, 𝛾 = 0.25.  
in the P&T committee during the decision making process. The contours show how the agents 
who had made decisions a priori affected the others with pure blue and red colors 
corresponding to the extreme decisions of +1 and −1. Within the square region, only 28% 
have values 𝑥(𝐳) > 0.  In the middle plot, 𝑥4 = +1 to show how the influences change with 
agent 4’s presence and playing an equal role as the other decided agents. The net positive area 
is now increased to 42%. The plot to the right depicts what would happen if the chair agent 
assumes a larger role than the other agents, depicting effective leadership. Accordingly, 𝑥4 =
+2 and 𝜎  is increased to 16 × 10−4  for this agent. The area covered by 𝑥(𝐳) > 0 increases 
significantly to 94% showing that the presence of an effective chair can play a decisive role in 
ensuring a fairer outcome. Although not directly related to this situation, the positive role of 
effective leadership has been reported elsewhere (Bland et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamic Voting Analysis 
While the analysis so far focuses entirely on how the agents influence each other based on the 
Laplacian, 𝐋 , the study discussed next, takes into account the productivity vector 𝐩 and is 
based on Eq. (12). The decision variable 𝑥𝑖
0 was initialized as shown in Eq. (8). The value of 𝛼 
was low at 𝛼 = 0.15, and that of 𝜀 was kept at 𝜀 = 0. With all other parameters at their earlier 
values, this study examined the role of inbreeding in influencing the undecided agents. 
Therefore 𝛾 was varied between 0 and 1 in steps of 0.2. The final decision vector was obtained 
for each value of 𝛾 , as shown in figure 4 with 𝜇 = 0.5  (left), 𝜇 = 1  (middle), and 𝜇 = 2.0 
(right). Within each subplot, the decisions of the agents in 𝒱U  appear sorted in order of 
increasing productivities. Thus, the decision 𝑥2 of agent 2 (𝑝2 = 0.229) is the leftmost and 𝑥5, 
which is that of agent 5 (𝑝5 = 3.779) is the rightmost. Within each histogram, the vertical bars 
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Figure 3. Influence diagram showing how an effective department chair may influence the 
outcome of the decision process with the following values of the constants: 𝜂 = 0.25, 𝑃max = 7, 
𝛾 = 0.25. The quantity 𝜎 = 4 × 10−4 for all agents except the department chair (4) which was 
𝜎 = 4 × 10−4 (left and middle columns) and 𝜎 = 16 × 10−4 (right column). 
Figure 4. Histograms showing the average votes of the undecided candidates, sorted in order of 
productivity with 𝜇 = 0.5  (left), 𝜇 = 1.0  (middle) and 𝜇 = 2.0 . (right). The inbreeding 
parameter 𝛾 were at values 𝛾 = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0. 
are colored according to the value of 𝛾. The purple bars correspond to 𝛾 = 0, blue bars to 𝛾 =
0.2 and so on, until the yellow bars, which are for 𝛾 = 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The effect of increasing 𝛾  is clearly seen. As it increases, the decisions 𝑥2  and 𝑥3  decrease 
steadily. This is because agents 2 and 3, which are in ℐ are more influenced by malicious agent 
11 who is also in ℐ . The decisions of the other agents, agent 5 and agent 9 remain largely 
unaffected. This decrease is seen for all three values of 𝜇. Moreover, the similarity of the three 
subplots indicate the robustness of the model to the parameter 𝜇. 
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4. Conclusion 
This research accurately models the outcome seen in a recent P&T decision process at a 
department. The proposed influence diagram which is based on algebraic graph theory, very 
effectively captures the voting patterns of the undecided agents. The dynamic analysis was 
able to eliminate the minor discrepancy that persisted between the model’s prediction with 
the observed outcome through the introduction of a small inbreeding coefficient. Although not 
shown, preliminary results in applying the model to randomly generated data reveals that the 
model is able to faithfully reproduce ‘common sense’ results where more research oriented 
faculty vote more consistently and fairly, than less productive ones. The author is investigating 
if there exists a tipping point in the ratio of unproductive to productive faculty, that when 
exceeded, leads to anomalous outcomes. 
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